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This paper analyzes eﬃciency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive
reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that
may increase eﬃciency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the
higher the reservation price is, the higher is the seller’s revenue and the higher is the
eﬃciency of a ﬁnal allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price
auction. The reservation price increases the bidder’s equilibrium strategy in a speciﬁc way
that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on eﬃciency
is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases eﬃciency in the
Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result
can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to
extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
An auction is an exchange mechanism with asymmetric information. It can be treated as a game in which the seller
offers one or more units (of the same type) to the participants. The seller does not know the bidder’s value of any particular
unit, but he can set up an explicit set of institutional rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids
from the auction participants. In Vickrey auctions (Vickrey, 1961) bidders reveal the true valuation of each unit and the
ﬁnal allocation is eﬃcient. Krishna (2002) formulates conditions when the equilibrium in a multi-unit auction is eﬃcient.
However, the equilibrium strategies in a multi-unit uniform-price auction do not satisfy these conditions (see Morgan, 2001).
The effect of reservation prices on a multi-unit auction is diﬃcult to assess in general (see Zhan, 2008). I show that in a
private value multi-unit uniform-price auction, a positive reservation price increases both eﬃciency and revenue. Therefore
it can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-
dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one, e.g., Armstrong (1996), Perry and Reny (1999), and Levin
(2004). For a benchmark of an auction game I follow the model with symmetric risk-neutral bidders who have independent-
private values and where the payment is a function of bids alone as suggested by McAfee and McMillan (1987). The only
additional assumptions are that the seller offers more than one unit for sale and the bidders demand two units that I call
“initial” and “subsequent.” This model has been analyzed in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998). I focus on the difference
between the bidder’s true value and the submitted bid which is called “bid shading” or “demand reduction” in the litera-
ture. In a uniform-price auction with no reservation price, a different shading in strategies on initial and subsequent units
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some speciﬁc (optimal) reservation price, the difference in shading on the initial and subsequent unit decreases, which can
prevent some ineﬃcient allocations of units and, moreover, the seller gains higher revenue.
For illustration, imagine two bidders in an auction with 2 units for sale with zero reservation price. Each bidder has two
values and submits two bids. I denote the values of the ﬁrst bidder v1, v2, the values of the second bidder as v ′1, v ′2 and the
bids of the ﬁrst bidder as b1, b2 and of the second bidder as b′1, b′2. If the values are such that v ′1 > v ′2 > v1 > v2, then it
is eﬃcient if the ﬁrst bidder wins both units. But in many cases equilibrium strategic behavior forces the bidders to submit
bids with the ordering b′1 > b1 > b′2 > b2, and the seller does not allocate the 2 units eﬃciently. When the seller increases
the reservation price above v1, the second bidder does not submit a bid above the reservation price, and the ﬁrst bidder
wins both units, which is an eﬃcient outcome.2 At the same time revenue typically increases. This reasoning is valid for
the multi-unit uniform-price and to some extent for other multi-unit auctions if b1 > b′2 and v1 < v ′2. On the other hand,
setting the reservation price too high introduces ineﬃciency when the supply is greater than the number of submitted bids
(e.g., v ′1 > R > v ′2 > v1 > v2). In summary, the seller faces a trade off between these two sources of ineﬃciency and the
total effect is ambiguous. In this paper I show that the expected eﬃciency typically increases when the seller increases the
reservation price above 0 in the uniform-price auction.
In addition, the results of this paper also contribute to the literature on eﬃcient multi-unit auction design. Krishna
(2002, Proposition 13.3) argues that equilibrium strategies cannot be eﬃcient if a shading difference across units is present.3
The seller who uses submitted bid ordering to allocate units cannot attain eﬃcient allocations when bidders use different
shading across initial and subsequent units. This paper, additionally, supports Krishna’s proposition that any means that
decrease shading differences can improve eﬃciency of the ﬁnal allocation. The reservation price is an example of such a
mean in a multi-unit uniform-price auction when the number of bidders is small.
The paper is organized as follows. At ﬁrst I discuss the relationship of this paper to other studies. Then, in the next
section, I develop a model of a uniform-price auction for n bidders, k units of supply, and a reservation price R . I also
derive expressions for the expected eﬃciency measures. In the rest of the paper, I disentangle two sources of ineﬃciency,
show the general conditions when the optimal reservation price that maximizes eﬃciency is positive, and demonstrate
this main contribution of the paper with a simple example. Finally, I brieﬂy discuss generalizations and conclude the pa-
per.
2. Relation to the multi-unit auction literature
Even in the early studies (e.g. Back and Zender, 1993; Vickrey, 1961) the authors argued that standard features
of single-unit auctions cannot be easily extended to multi-unit environments. To design an eﬃcient multi-unit auc-
tion is a diﬃcult task in general (see Zhan, 2008 and Klemperer, 2000 for surveys, and Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000;
Perry and Reny, 2005a, 2005b for speciﬁc cases), and is not attainable in speciﬁc cases (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001a;
Ausubel and Cramton, 2002; Krishna, 2002; Morgan, 2001).
There are many studies in the literature that analyze the so-called bid shading or demand reduction effect (see Ausubel
and Cramton, 2002; Krishna, 2002; Menezes and Monteiro, 2005 and Zhan, 2008). Also, in the experimental literature
(see Kagel and Levin, 2001; List and Lucking-Riley, 2002 and Engelmann and Grimm, 2009) the bid shading was detected
especially in the open uniform-price auction format. The bid shading effect is also present in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn
(1998), who derive essential features of equilibrium strategies that I use as a benchmark model.
In the model designed by Back and Zender (1993) a positive reservation price is an important policy tool that diminishes
the bid shading effect; i.e., the higher the reservation price is, the higher the seller’s revenue is. An important contribution
of my paper is that increasing the reservation price above zero not only diminishes the bid shading and increases the seller’s
revenue but, in addition, also improves eﬃciency, which has not been pointed out in the literature yet. Similarly to Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2001b) I split sources of ineﬃciency between the misallocation effect and supply restriction effect that I
denote as MLoss and ULoss, respectively, in Section 4.
If the seller sets a positive reservation price, then bid shading diminishes because each bidder strictly increases his
subsequent bid (see Fig. 1) for any given subsequent value above the reservation price. Therefore, the difference in shading
across the initial and subsequent unit decreases (cf. the dark area and the same area with the light shaded area added).
Fig. 1 illustrates that the smaller the shaded area is, the smaller is the misallocation ineﬃciency that I call MLoss. Note
that if the shaded area fully disappears, then the MLoss is zero and the necessary conditions for eﬃcient multi-unit auction
provided by Proposition 13.3 in Krishna (2002) are satisﬁed. In other words, one can consider the shaded area as a kind of
measure closely related to misallocation ineﬃciency. This source of ineﬃciency is diminished by the reservation price. On
the other hand, the positive reservation price increases the ULoss because the bidders bid below the reservation price for
their low values. In short, an essential prerequisite for the effect studied in this paper is that each bidder bids fairly below
his value for some but not all units (cf. Morgan, 2001, p. 815).
2 Throughout the text, the words “above” and “below” mean strictly above and strictly below.
3 Krishna (2002) uses the term “symmetry in strategies across objects” to mean “absence of difference in shading across units” in my terminology. But I
use the term symmetric strategies to mean the “symmetry in strategies across bidders only” excluding “symmetry in strategies across objects” to simplify
the terminology of this paper.
M. Bresky / Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) 205–217 207Fig. 1. The effect of reservation price on bidding strategies. Dark shaded area represents the integration range in MLoss formula below when the reservation
price is positive. For notation see Section 3.
3. The model of the uniform-price sealed bid auction
I describe a model of multi-unit auctions with risk-neutral bidders having continuous distributions of private values
similarly as in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), and Noussair (1995). Let us consider a seller who announces to sell
k (k  2) identical units to n (n  2) bidders each of whom submits two bids. To exclude trivial cases not all bids can
be satisﬁed (2 · n > k). I assume that bidders are symmetric and omit the bidder’s index i unless needed for clarity. Each
bidder observes private information v = (v1, v2) which is the initial and subsequent value of the unit the bidder can win.4
Moreover, the subsequent value is less than or equal to the initial value for each bidder, i.e., v1  v2.5
The distribution of values is identical for all bidders and independent of the opponent value realization. Let G(v1, v2),
which has support on interval V = [0, v¯1] × [0, v¯2], denote the probability distribution function of the private values v1
and v2 where v¯1 and v¯2 are the upper boundaries of the support.6 I assume that the marginal distributions of initial
and subsequent units are continuous. I denote them as G1(v1) and G2(v2), and their densities as g1(v1) and g2(v2). In
particular, I admit that the two values of the same bidder are dependent on each other.
The game. Before the auction the seller announces the number of units for sale and a reservation price R ∈ [0,∞). Each
bidder submits two sealed ﬁnite bids b1,b2 ∈ [0,∞), that are denoted as b. If more than k bids are submitted above the
reservation price R , then the seller chooses the k highest bids that win a unit in the auction. A tie occurs when the kth
and k + 1st highest bids are equal and the seller breaks such a tie randomly.7,8 The auction price that each bidder pays for
winning each unit is equal to k + 1st highest bid. If less than k + 1 bids are submitted above or equal to the reservation
price R , then each of them wins a unit and pays the price R .
Since the seller orders bids after submission, I assume without loss of generality that each bidder submits ordered pair of
bids b1  b2. I denote the set of all these bid pairs as B. A bidder’s ex post payoff depends on the number of units he wins,
the realization of his values, v , his bids, b, his opponent’s bids, b− , the reservation price, R , and the random tie-breaking
rule if a tie occurs with positive probability:
π(v,b,b−, R) =
(
v1 −max(b2, ck, R)
) · I(b1 wins)
+ (v2 +max(b2, ck, R) − 2 ·max(ck−1, R)) · I(b2 wins), (3.1)
where ck and ck−1 are kth and k − 1st highest opponent bids.
A pure strategy is a list of submitted bids based on the observed information that bidder i knows before the auction,
including his private values, the reservation price, the distribution of all bidder values, the number of units for sale, and the
number of opponents. For the sake of simplicity I will write the pure strategy as a function of private values only. Then the
pure strategy is a mapping b(·) : V → B (b(v) = [b1(v),b2(v)]) such that b1(·), and b2(·) are measurable.
When opponents use strategies b−(·), then the ex ante pointwise payoff to the bidder, whose values are v and who
bids b, is
4 A bidder derives value v1 from one unit and value v1 + v2 from two objects.
5 If not, assume that the bidder orders the values for units without loss of generality.
6 Symbol × means the Cartesian product. Note that v¯1  v¯2.
7 The deﬁnition of the tie allows other bids to be tied with the kth and k + 1st highest bids.
8 A speciﬁc rule for breaking ties is not important. It is known that with “reasonable” tie-breaking rules ties occur in equilibrium with probability 0. See
Jackson and Swinkels (2005) for details.
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(
v,b|b−(·), R
)= E(π(v,b,b−, R))
= (v1 − b1) ·
(
Pk(b1) + τ1(b,b−) · P (b1 = ck)
)+
b1∫
max(b2,R)
Pk(ck)dck · I(b1  R)
+
(
(v2 − b2) ·
(
Pk−1(b2) + τ2(b,b−) · P (b2 = ck−1)
)+ 2 ·
b2∫
R
Pk−1(ck−1)
)
· I(b2  R), (3.2)
where I denote by Pk− j+1(x) the probability that at most k − j opponent bids are above x given the opponent strategies
and τ j(b,b−) the probability that the seller breaks a tie in favor of bidder j = 1 or 2. If the bidder submits such a bid that
a tie occurs and the seller uses a random rule, then a bidder’s ex ante payoff is (v j − b j) · τ j(b,b−) where 0< τ j(b,b−) < 1.
The detailed discussion of this formula exceeds the scope of this paper and can be found in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn
(1998) for the case R = 0 and Bresky (2008) for other cases. I use the word payoff to mean the ex ante payoff when no
confusion arises.
The bidder maximizes his payoff from a strategy b(·)
max
b(·)
E
(
π
(
v,b|b−(·), R
))
, (3.3)
where the expectations are taken over v which induces the probability measure of π(v,b|b−(·), R).
Throughout the rest of the paper I take the liberty to apply the results shown in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998)
on the shape of symmetric equilibrium strategies who analyzed the case when R = 0. Let me derive the ﬁrst-order condition
of (3.2) with respect to b2 when no tie occurs
∂π(v,b|b−(·))
∂b2
= (v2 − b2) · ∂ Pk−1(b2)
∂b2
− (Pk(b2) − Pk−1(b2))= 0 (3.4)
that is very similar to the ﬁrst-order condition of the ﬁrst-price auction and some features of subsequent strategy can be
derived using an analogy with the ﬁrst-price auction. The subsequent bid inﬂuences the probability of winning of the subse-
quent unit and at the same time determines the price the bidder pays in the auction when the bid is the ﬁrst-rejected one.
The interpretation of Eq. (3.4) is discussed in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998). I will focus on symmetric equilibrium
strategies when a bidder reveals his initial value in the initial bid and the subsequent bid is an increasing function of the
value v2 up to the range of values from [0, v¯0) when the bidder may bid 0 but only in the case that R = 0 and that the
number of bidders is at least as high as the number of units for sale.9
b1(v1, v2, R) = v1 for v1 ∈ [0, v¯1], and
b2(v1, v2, R) =
{ v2 for 0 v2  R
R for R  v2  v¯0
b2(v2, R) for v¯0  v2
for some v¯0  R, (3.5)
where b2(v2, R) is increasing in v2 and v¯0 = R if R > 0 or n < k.
The conditions A and B below guarantee that the strategy proﬁle above (see Eq. (3.5)) is an equilibrium.
Condition A. For every v2 > 0, there is a number ε > 0 such that for any valuation v1 G2(v2|v1) > ε. Condition A says
that for any v1 there is some chance that v2 is close to 0. This condition is valid if any open neighborhood of zero in V has
a positive measure (cf. Condition C in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998).
Condition B. The marginal density g1(v1) is bounded in some neighborhood of 0. Condition B is suﬃcient to guarantee
that the strategy with bid shading is the best response to the same behavior of other bidders when the reservation price
is 0 and there are at least as many bidders as units for sale; i.e. v¯0 > 0 when R = 0 and k  n in (3.5) (cf. Theorem 4.2 in
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998).
The following lemmas guarantee that strategies (3.5) form a “well-behaved” equilibrium with bid shading.
Lemma 1. If conditionA is satisﬁed, then there exist a strategy (3.5) that is a symmetric equilibrium of the uniform-price auction game
deﬁned in this section for any R  0. Moreover, if condition B is satisﬁed, then there exists an equilibrium in which bid shading occurs
(v¯0 > 0) if R = 0 and n k.
9 To justify this restriction one can focus on the perfect equilibria only that were deﬁned and analyzed in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998). For
n = k 2 and R = 0 consider the following equilibrium without perfection b1(v1, v2, R) = v¯1 and b2(v1, v2, R) = 0 (see explanation in Swinkels, 2001,
5.1 and Blume et al., 2009). When taking this equilibrium into account Theorem 6 below is valid with a stronger effect, but the notation and proofs of
Theorems 5 and 6 are more complicated.
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To show that there exists an equilibrium in which b1(v1, v2, R) = v1 one can apply Theorem 6 by Jackson and Swinkels
(2005) on a special uniform-price auction game in which bidders are restricted to bid b1(v1, v2, R) = v1. Such an auction
game satisﬁes all assumptions of Theorem 6 by Jackson and Swinkels (2005) and the equilibrium remains an equilibrium
even in the game when bidders are not restricted to bid b1(v1, v2, R) = v1 because the bidders cannot improve upon when
bidding b1(v1, v2, R) = v1 in the uniform-price auction. In the proof of Theorem 6 Jackson and Swinkels (2005, p. 119) use
Theorem 3.1 by Reny (1999). To obtain the existence of a symmetric mixed equilibrium in a uniform-price auction game
with symmetric bidders one should employ Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 5.3 by Reny (1999) instead of using Theorem 3.1 in
the proof of Theorem 6 by Jackson and Swinkels (2005). Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) show that any equilibrium
can be rearranged in such a way that the player’s second bid is independent of the valuation placed on his ﬁrst unit
when R = 0 using condition A (cf. Theorem 8.12 in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998). I leave it up to the reader
to extend this theorem to the case when R > 0 to obtain b2(v1, v2, R) = b2(v2, R). Moreover, the results of Section 3 in
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) are valid for the auctions that I consider and can be modiﬁed by the reader to show
that v¯0 = R if R > 0 or n < k.
Let me outline that there exists an equilibrium with bid shading i.e. bidders bid zero on the second unit for v2 ∈ [0, v¯2]
if R = 0 and n  k. Using the same arguments from the previous paragraph applied to a special auction game in which
bidders are restricted to use strategies with bid shading the reader can see that equilibrium exists. Such an equilibrium
remains to be an equilibrium even in the game when bidders are not restricted to use strategies with bid shading because
the bidders cannot improve upon when bidding b2(v2,0) > 0 which is guaranteed by condition B (see Theorem 4.2 in
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998).
The last condition is related to the continuity of the subsequent strategy.
Condition C. The marginal density g2(·) is weakly increasing and the following inequality holds (k− 1)g1(x) < g2(x) for all
x in the support of g2(·).
The condition C is suﬃcient for every subsequent symmetric equilibrium strategy being continuous in v2 which, more-
over, implies that the symmetric subsequent strategy is increasing in R .
Lemma 2. If condition C is satisﬁed, then there exists an equilibrium strategy (3.5) that is continuous and increasing in v2 and
increasing in R when k 3.
The idea is similar to Lizzeri and Persico (2000) who study the ﬁrst-price auctions with reservation price. Bresky (2008)
shows that the two subsequent equilibrium strategies cannot cross, otherwise a better response can be constructed. Note
that if the bidders use symmetric strategies and reveal the initial value in the initial bid, then π(v,b|b−(·)) depends only
on G(·, ·), v,b because the bidder defeats subsequent bids of the opponents with a value below v2. The reason is similar to
the single-unit ﬁrst-price auction symmetric equilibrium in which a bidder’s marginal payoff can be expressed as a function
of the bidder’s value, the distribution of value and bid – but not the opponent’s strategy (see McAfee and McMillan, 1987).
The parallel arguments are valid for the uniform-price auction model of this paper (see Appendix A for the details). Then,
since it is an equilibrium strategy to bid b2(R, R) = R , it must be that b2(v2, ·) is increasing in R .
Conditions A, B, and C above on the distribution of values used in this paper are discussed in more detail in
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), Bresky (2008). They are suﬃcient to guarantee that equilibrium strategies are “well-
behaved,” but if one relaxes them Theorem 6 at the end of the following section is still applicable in some cases.
4. The effect of reservation price on eﬃciency
In the auction the seller can maximize revenue, eﬃciency, or a mixture of both. In this section I propose a deﬁnition
of the seller’s objective function to measure eﬃciency and revenue. It is intuitive that a positive reservation price usually
increases a bidder’s subsequent strategy and also the seller’s revenue. I split eﬃciency into two parts. Then I show that the
effect of the reservation price changes on each of the two parts works in opposite directions. Moreover, I show that setting
the reservation price above zero is typically optimal and that is the main point of the paper. I specify conditions when 0 is
not an eﬃcient optimal reservation price and the seller who sets a positive reservation price decreases expected eﬃciency
loss when allocating the units to the bidders.
I will assume that the seller does not assign any value for the units. Let me denote K as the number of bids greater than
or equal to R . Then the seller’s revenue Rev is
Rev(R) =
{
k · c if k < K ,
K · R if k K , (4.1)
where c is the k + 1st highest submitted bid.
If the seller allocates all k units to those who value them the most, then the total welfare that could be (potentially)
distributed among all bidders is
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k∑
j=1
w j, (4.2)
where w j is the jth highest value of all bidders’ initial and subsequent values.
But in an auction the seller allocates units according to submitted bids. As the bidders do not necessarily reveal the true
value in their subsequent bids, the auction welfare that is distributed among all bidders is
AW =
min(k,K )∑
j=1
W j, (4.3)
where K denotes the number of accepted bids and W j is the value corresponding to the jth highest bid of all bidders’
initial and subsequent bids. In other words, the values W1, . . . ,Wmin(k,K ) are the winning values in the auction.
I introduce the following measure of expected eﬃciency (cf. with Palfrey, 1983, and Alsemgeest et al., 1998) deﬁned as10
W (R) = E(AW )
E(PW )
= E(
∑min(k,K )
j=1 W j)
E(
∑k
j=1 w j)
. (4.4)
The expected eﬃciency loss in the auction I deﬁne as
Loss(R) = E(PW ) − E(AW ) = E
(
k∑
j=1
w j
)
− E
(min(k,K )∑
j=1
W j
)
. (4.5)
AW is a function of bidders’ strategies, and therefore eﬃciency and loss also depend on the reservation price R .
Lemma 3. The seller whomaximizes themean value of all bidder utility (4.3) or maximizes the expected auction eﬃciency or minimizes
expected loss (4.5), then chooses the same optimal reservation price R:
arg max
0Rv¯
E(AW ) = arg max
0Rv¯
W (R) = arg min
0Rv¯
Loss(R). (4.6)
I will use the term to optimize eﬃciency loss or eﬃciency to mean any of the equivalent measures in Lemma 3.
Let us assume a seller is somehow able to transfer the auction revenue among bidders in a lump-sum way. One could
imagine that the seller is a government selling state property (e.g., radio frequency licenses or T-bills). The government’s
main goal should be not only to maximize the revenue or minimize interest rate costs, but also to maximize the bidders’
welfare. The ultimate objective function of the seller would place some weight t on revenue and 1 − t weight on bidders’
welfare (0 t < 1). Then, the society objective function is
t Rev(R) + (1− t)E(AW ) = t Rev(R) + (1− t)(E(PW ) − Loss(R)). (4.7)
First note that the single-unit symmetric ﬁrst-price auction is eﬃcient if the seller sets a zero reservation price. In a sym-
metric equilibrium, all bidders use symmetric strategies, and if the reservation price is zero, there is no eﬃciency loss in
the ﬁnal allocation. The multi-unit Vickrey auction is eﬃcient if the seller sets a zero reservation price. In this auction all
bidders use the same true-value revealing strategy on all private values. If the seller sets a positive reservation price in
either of these two auctions, then the bidders with values below the reservation price do not participate in the auction.
This introduces eﬃciency loss because the seller’s value of the units he does not sell in the auction is zero.11
In the multi-unit uniform-price auction with zero reservation price, the auction allocation is not eﬃcient (see Noussair,
1995). One explanation is that a necessary condition for an eﬃcient auction method (Krishna, 2002, Proposition 13.3) is
violated. Namely, bidders do not apply the same mapping from value to bid (e.g., bidders do not bid the true value both on
the initial and subsequent value). Due to the difference in bid shading across initial and subsequent units, the seller who
uses the bids to distribute units is not able to allocate them eﬃciently.
In Section 1 I outlined that bid shading present in equilibrium strategies (3.5) motivates a bidder with high subsequent
value to submit a bid below an opponent bidder’s initial bid of low initial value. If the seller speciﬁes a reservation price,
some of the bidders do not submit bids above the reservation price, but the others submit higher bids and shade less of
their true values. This means that bids on subsequent units reveal more precisely the true values, the initial and subsequent
strategy of each bidder become more similar and the seller allocates units eﬃciently more often (see Fig. 1). In other words,
some misallocations caused by the shading difference in initial and subsequent strategies can be eliminated by properly
setting the reservation price.
10 An alternative measure of eﬃciency is Eff (R) = E(∑min(k,K )j=1 W j/∑kj=1 w j). Note that Theorem 6, the ﬁnal one, is valid even using this measure
(cf. Swinkels, 1999).
11 Note that the qualitative result is valid even if the seller assigns positive value to retained units (Krishna, 2002).
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ber of bids submitted. I distinguish between misallocation effect and supply restriction effect similarly as in Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001b). In each case the effect of the reservation price on eﬃciency is different.
• Loss due to misallocated units that occurs when more than k submitted bids are above R or at R . Due to the difference
in shading across initial and subsequent values, the highest submitted bids do not necessarily correspond to the highest
values and therefore units are not allocated to the bidders with the highest values, MLoss.
• Loss due to unallocated units that occurs when less than k submitted bids are above R or at R , ULoss.
Note that in the remaining case when exactly k submitted bids are above R or at R , no loss occurs. The reason is that
in equilibrium (3.5) bidders submit bids above R or at R if and only if their values are above R or at R . But then the
submitted bids correspond to the k highest values and the seller allocates the units to the bidders with highest values that
is the eﬃcient allocation.12
Obviously an analogue of ULoss is present in a symmetric equilibrium for a standard single-unit auction. However, an
analogue of MLoss is not present. In the symmetric single-unit auction with the reservation price, the loss occurs only if no
bidder submits a bid above R or at R , and the seller has no value for the unit when it is not sold in the auction. In the
uniform-price auction, ULoss occurs if not all k units are sold in the auction because less than k bids are submitted above
a too high reservation price R . Given the shape of equilibrium strategies (3.5), this means that if any value v (initial or
subsequent) below the reservation price is one of the k highest values, then ULoss occurs. Consider one bidder with values
v1 and v2. Then his values contribute to ULoss with the term
E(v1|R > v1 & at most k − 1 opponents’ values are above v1)
+ E(v2|R > v2 & at most k − 2 opponents’ values are above v2).
The expected value of this kind of loss, denoted as ULoss(R), is characterized by the following theorem (see proof in
Appendix A).
Theorem 4. The expected value of ULoss is
ULoss(R) = n ·
( R∫
0
v1Hk−1(v1)dG1(v1) +
R∫
0
v2Hk−2(v2)dG2(v2)
)
, (4.8)
where Hl(x) is the probability distribution function of the event when at most l out of the 2 · (n − 1) opponent values are above x.
Hl(x) = P (at most l out of 2n − 2 opponent values > x)
=
∑
02i2+i1l
i1,i20
(n − 1)!
i2!i1!(n − 1− i2 − i1)!
(
1− G2(x)
)i2(G2(x) − G1(x))i1Gn−1−i2−i11 (x). (4.9)
ULoss(R) is increasing in R if the equilibrium strategy b2(v ′2, R) is increasing in R for any v ′2 ∈ (R, v¯2], and ULoss(0) = 0. Moreover,
if the equilibrium strategy is continuous in R, then MLoss(R) is continuous in R.
Let me consider two bidders and their opponents when 2 k  2 · (n − 1). I denote the initial value of the ﬁrst bidder
as v1 and the subsequent value of the second bidder as v ′2 and let b1 be the bid of the ﬁrst bidder on v1 and b′2 be the
bid of the second bidder on v ′2. By the deﬁnition of MLoss the two values v ′2, v1 of the two bidders contribute to MLoss
if and only if v ′2 is one of the highest k values but v1 is not and b1 wins a unit but b′2 does not. Given that bidders use
equilibrium strategies (3.5), let me consider v ′2 above R or at R and v1 such that v ′2 > v1 > b′2, then I proof in Appendix A
that the difference v ′2 − v1 contributes to MLoss if and only if at least k − 2 opponent values are above v1, and at most
k− 2 opponent values are above v ′2.13 There are n · (n− 1) of such combinations of the two bidders. Therefore the expected
value of this loss that I denote as MLoss(R) is characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The formula for MLoss(R) is
MLoss(R) = n · (n − 1) ·
v¯2∫
R
v ′2∫
b2(v ′2,R)
(
v ′2 − v1
)
Ω
(
v ′2, v1
)
dG1(v1)dG2
(
v ′2
)
, (4.10)
12 Recall also that we need not analyze the case when the values are equal because G1(v1) and G2(v2) are continuous. If G1(v1) and G2(v2) are
discontinuous then the formulas (4.8) and (4.10) are more complicated but Theorem 6 seems to be valid anyway.
13 It is an exercise from combinatorics that values v1 and v ′2, and their bids b1 and b′2 contribute to MLoss if and only if at least k − 2 opponent values
are above v , and at most k − 2 opponent values are above v ′ (given that bidders use equilibrium strategies (3.5) and v ′ > b > b′  R).1 2 2 1 2
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where
Ω
(
v ′2, v1
)= ∑
0 j k2 −1
0n−k+ j
(n − 2)!
j!(k − 2 j − 2)!(n − k + j)!Ω j
(
v ′2, v1
)
,
and
Ω j
(
v ′2, v1
)= (1− G2(v ′2)) j(G2(v ′2)− G1(v1))k−2 j−2Gn−k+ j1 (v1).
For k < 2n− 1, MLoss(R) is a decreasing function of R if the equilibrium strategy b2(v ′2, R) is increasing in R for any v ′2 ∈ (R, v¯2].
Moreover, if the equilibrium strategy is continuous in R, then MLoss(R) is continuous in R.
The terms of Ω j(v ′2, v1) are illustrated in Fig. 2 and explained in Appendix A.
Let me now investigate the effect of R on MLoss(R) and ULoss(R) if more than one submitted bid cannot win (k = 2,
. . . ,2n − 2). Note that if MLoss occurs, then all k units are sold in the auction but if ULoss occurs, less than k units are
sold. Therefore they do not occur simultaneously and total Loss(R) is just the sum of ULoss(R) and MLoss(R). A seller who
optimizes Loss(R) or any equivalent eﬃciency measure faces a trade off between MLoss and ULoss. The theorem below
shows that the reservation price that minimizes the total expected loss is typically positive when the following condition is
valid.
Condition D. For R slightly above 0, the strategy is continuous in R , and g1(·) and g2(·) exists and satisfy the following
condition:
lim
b2→0+
b2g2(b2)(G2(b2) − G1(b2))iGk−1−i1 (b2)
g1(b2)
= 0 for all i = 0, . . . ,k − 2. (4.11)
Theorem 6. Consider a symmetric equilibrium strategy increasing in R for any R close enough to 0 when k = 2, . . . ,2n − 2. Assume
that for some v¯0 > 0 and every v2 ∈ [0, v¯0], the bidder bids 0 if the reservation price is 0. Then MLoss(0) + ULoss(0) > MLoss(R) +
ULoss(R). Moreover, assume that condition D is valid.
Then MLoss(R) + ULoss(R) is continuous and decreasing in R for R slightly above 0.
The theorem above (proved in Appendix A) imposes assumptions on the distribution of values and the shape of equilib-
rium strategy. Condition D is not too restrictive and can be relaxed in some cases. If the initial and subsequent values
are distributed as the minimum and maximum of some underlying distribution, then condition D is satisﬁed for any
distribution.14 Moreover, the other conditions on the shape of the equilibrium strategy can be relaxed in the sense that
bidders need not bid 0 for values v2 ∈ [0, v¯0] when the reservation price is 0. In many cases it seems to be suﬃcient
if the derivative ∂b2(0,0)v2 is not large. That implies less restrictive conditions on the distribution of bidder values and al-
lows us to apply Theorem 6 if the number of bidders is less than the number of units for sale when Corollary 7 below
14 Let v1 = min(x1, x2) and v2 = max(x1, x2) where x1 and x2 have underlying probability distribution function H(·). Then G1(v) = H2(v) and G2(v) =
2H(v) − H2(v), and the limit term in condition D is 2vh(v)(2H(v)(1−H(v)))i+1H2(k−1−i)(v)2H(v)h(v) = 2i v(1− H(v))i+1H2k−3−i(v) which is 0 in the limit for any H(v).
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cases.
In Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) it is shown that for most distributions including those with bounded g1(·)
in the neighborhood of 0, it is typical to bid 0 for low subsequent values v2 ∈ [0, v¯0] in equilibrium if the seller sets a 0
reservation price and there are at least as many bidders as units for sale (see also Menezes and Monteiro, 2005, Theorem 24).
The assumption that symmetric equilibrium strategies are increasing functions of the reserve price is intuitive. Moreover,
this feature is analyzed in Bresky (2008) who shows that it is valid for continuous equilibrium strategies (see suﬃcient
condition D). I summarize it in the following corollary.
Corollary 7. If the distribution of values satisﬁes conditionsA,B,C, andD and n k 3, then the seller who sets a positive reservation
price improves the expected eﬃciency of the ﬁnal allocation.
Since the equilibrium strategy b2(v2, R) exists, the marginal distributions G1(v1) and G2(v2) are continuous and
there are no ties in equilibrium, then the function MLoss(R) + ULoss(R) is continuous and bounded on a compact set
containing 0. Hence, the reservation price that improves the expected eﬃciency exists and it is positive according to Theo-
rem 6.
An example of the density function g(v1, v2) that satisﬁes conditions A, B, C, and D for any parameter λ ∈ (−1,0) and
any k = 2, . . . ,2+  11+λ  is16
g(v1, v2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(2+λ)·v1+λ2
v2+λ1
for 0 v2  v1  1+λ2+λ ,
(2+λ)3+λ
(1+λ)2+λ · v1+λ2 for 0 v2  1+λ2+λ and 1+λ2+λ  v1  1,
0 otherwise.
For k = 2 the shape of equilibrium strategies can be richer and does not allow for an extension of Lemma 2. I will not
analyze this case in general (cf. Section 5 in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998). In Example 1 below I illustrate that the
main idea of Theorem 6 works even in this case when the distribution of values is uniform, the bid shading is present and
the reservation price diminishes the demand reduction and bid shading effect. I will show the effect of reservation price
changes on the MLoss, ULoss, Loss and welfare measure (4.7).
Example 1. Suppose two units are auctioned, both of the two bidders’ initial and subsequent values (v1, v2) are uniformly
distributed on {v|v¯  v1  v2  0} where v¯ = v¯1 = v¯2 is the upper boundary of the value support.17 Then it can be veriﬁed
that the following is a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy18
b1(v1, v2, R) = v1 and b2(v1, v2, R) =
{
R if v2 > R,
0 if v2  R.
(4.12)
The expected value of total eﬃciency loss with the reservation price is just a summation of MLoss and ULoss because
they represent mutually disjoint cases and it is after substitution into (4.8) and (4.10)
Loss(R) = MLoss(R) + ULoss(R) = v¯
15
− 2
3
R2
v¯
+ 4
3
R3
v¯2
+ 2 R
4
v¯3
− 32
5
R5
v¯4
.
The seller who minimizes Loss(R) sets the reservation price at RLoss = 0.250 · v¯ . For the sake of brevity I will just provide
the formula for the seller’s revenue19:
Rev(R) = R · (2 · (L2,0 + 2 · L1,1 + 2 · L0,2 + 2 · L1,0)+ 2 · L0,1 + 0 · L0,0).
The maximum revenue is achieved at RRev = 0.581 · v¯ .
15 If ρ is limsupR0→0+
∂b2
∂R (R0, R0) and k = 3, a suﬃcient condition to guarantee that Loss is decreasing for R slightly above 0 is limR→0+ G1(R)G2( Rρ )−G2(R) < ∞
and limR→0+ G2(R)−G1(R)G2( Rρ )−G2(R)
< ∞. By L’Hopital’s rule this suﬃcient condition is valid for any G(v1, v2) if ρ < 1 including n = 2. In other words, increase of R
improves eﬃciency even if pooling of bids at 0 deﬁned in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) is not present.
16 One can check that G1(v1) = v1 for 0 v1  1 and G2(v2) = 2+λ1+λ · v2 for 0 v2  1+λ2+λ .
17 The density function is g(v1, v2) = 2v¯2 if v¯  v1  v2  0 and otherwise g(v1, v2) = 0. Each bidder’s values are minimum and maximum of two
independent draws from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, v¯].
18 The ﬁrst-order condition implies that 2b2(v2 − b2) = 2v¯ v2 − v22 − b22. It cannot be satisﬁed for any b2 ∈ [R, v2] ⊆ (0, v¯). This often occurs in this
multi-unit auction by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998, see Example 1 and Section 4).
19 Where Li2 i1 = n!
i2 !i1 !(n−i2−i1)!v¯2n (v¯ − R)
2i2+i1 · R2n−2i2−i1 is the probability that exactly i1 (i1 = 0,1,2) bidders have their initial values above R and
subsequent values below R , exactly i2 (i2 = 0, . . . ,n − i1) bidders have both values above R , and other n − i1 − i2 bidders have both values below R .
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tion (4.7). One can imagine that a unit gain in revenue can be distributed among bidders in such a way that their welfare
increases by t1−t units. For t = 0.5, the optimal reservation price is R0.5 = 0.496 · v¯ .
Finally I show that if just one submitted bid cannot win (k = 2n − 1), then the eﬃcient optimal reservation price is 0.
Theorem 8. If the number of units for sale is 2 ·n−1 = k 3, then the reservation price maximizing eﬃciency or minimizing eﬃciency
loss is 0.
In this auction exactly one bid does not win a unit but determines the auction price. The strategic considerations in
this game are in some sense dual to a single-unit second-price auction where exactly one bid wins a unit but does not
determine the auction price (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 2002).
5. Conclusion
This paper shows the signiﬁcance of reservation prices in a multi-unit auction with independent-private-value bidders,
not only for revenue-gaining, but also for eﬃciency or social welfare reasons. In a typical case, the outcome of the multi-unit
auction is not eﬃcient. The reason for this is that bidders, although symmetric, use different strategies on the initial and
subsequent unit they demand. The difference in strategies distorts eﬃciency in many cases (see Krishna, 2002). A similar
distortion is well-known in an English single-unit auction with asymmetric bidders or in the case when the seller favors one
group of bidders over the rest of the bidders (see McAfee and McMillan, 1987). But in a multi-unit auction the difference
in strategies occurs even though the bidders are symmetric, risk-neutral, independent private-valued, and payment is a
function of the bids alone (cf. with assumptions A1–A4 in McAfee and McMillan, 1987).
One of the principal goals of the literature survey by Zhan (2008) is a trade off between eﬃciency and revenue in
auctions. In this paper I use a differential equation approach to derive a comparative statics result on the effect of the
reservation price on eﬃciency and revenue in the uniform-price multi-unit auction. I disentangle two sources of eﬃciency
loss because the reservation price has two effects: (1) it excludes bidders with values below the reservation price from the
auction; and (2) it motivates the bidders to bid closer to their true values above the reservation price. The former effect
decreases revenue and introduces eﬃciency loss if not enough bidder values, and hence bids, are above the reservation
price. The latter effect improves both the eﬃciency and the revenue if enough values, and hence the bids, are submitted
above the reservation price. For low reservation prices, the latter case occurs more often and, therefore, an increase of the
reservation price improves the eﬃciency. This is in contrast to the single-unit ﬁrst- and second-price auction models in
McAfee and McMillan (1987) with symmetric bidders. Palfrey (1983) shows that the seller who sells units in bundles may
increase revenue at the expense of eﬃciency. In contrast, I show that a positive reservation price not far from zero increases
both revenue and eﬃciency in the uniform-price auction.
The inﬂuence of the reservation price depends on the level of bid shading or demand reduction on each unit. The bid
shading varies for each auction format. For the uniform-price auction, the effect of the reservation price on eﬃciency is
opposite to that for the Vickrey auction, when the reservation price is not far from 0. A question for future research is what
effect prevails for other auction formats (e.g., pay-your-bid) that have been only partially studied in the multi-unit auction
literature (Swinkels, 1999, and Lebrun and Tremblay, 2003). It seems that proper reservation price setting is an important
mechanism design tool to set up an optimal multi-unit auction when the number of bidders is not large.
The eﬃcient optimal reservation price depends on the number of bidders. The marginal increase in eﬃciency is not too
great if there are many bidders in the auction, but it determines the kind of lower bound of the optimal reservation price
which maximizes both revenue and eﬃciency. Therefore, the government as a seller who cares about both revenue and
eﬃciency should never set the reservation price below this lower bound.
Although I used an independent-private-value assumption, this model is applicable to other real uniform-price auctions
because they are typically regarded as a mixture of independent private-value and common-value paradigms. In this case
there is no general auction mechanism to achieve ex post eﬃciency. One application is to the auctions of licenses for
the radio-frequency spectrum (PCS) by the Federal Communication Commission (certainly there are a lot of institutional
details that make the analysis more complicated, see Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996). Another important application is the
uniform-price auction of T-bill securities (T-bills) if the common-value assumption seems not to be appropriate. Hortacsu
and Kastl (2012) could not reject the hypotheses of the private value component in 3-months T-bills. Moreover, T-bill
auctions can be treated as a partially independent value auction if the secondary market is far enough from perfect liquidity,
which is typical for emerging markets (e.g., the T-bill market in the Czech Republic and other CEEC).
It seems, at least intuitively, that the reservation price increases eﬃciency even if we enrich the model by a more compli-
cated demand curve that has uncertainty in every demanded unit or assuming interdependencies among the bidder values
(or signals). This intuition supports the result of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), who formed the transformation of
a class of 3 unit demand models into 2 unit demand models. Finally, although comparisons between the uniform-price and
pay-your-bid auctions are diﬃcult (cf. Katzman, 1999) it seems that the uniform-price auction requires more information
gathering and strategic considerations from the seller to design the auction because the auction outcome is more sensitive
to an optimal reservation price than the pay-your-bid auction.
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Proof of Lemma 3. The optimization E(AW ) differs from criterion (4.4) only by the multiplicative term 1E(PW ) , which is in-
dependent of R . The objective functions E(AW ) can be obtained from the objective function (4.5) by a linear transformation
with the additive term E(PW ) and the multiplicative term −1 both of which are independent of R . 
Proof of Theorem 4. The formula (4.9) is fairly intuitive. The term 1 − G2(x) is the probability that a bidder has both
values above x. The term G2(x) − G1(x) is the probability that a bidder has an initial value above x and a subsequent value
below x, and the term G1(x) is the probability that a bidder has both values below x. Each term in the summation (4.9) is
the probability that exactly 2i2+ i1 values of n−1 bidders are above x. This can be arranged by (n−1)!i2!i1!(n−1−i2−i1)! combinations
when exactly i1 out of n− 1 bidders have their initial values above x and subsequent values below x, exactly i2 out of n− 1
bidders have both values above x, and other bidders out of n−1 bidders have both values below x. The ULoss(R) in (4.8) is n
times the expected contribution of a single bidder’s initial and subsequent values v j ( j = 1,2) that are below the reservation
price and above the k − jth highest opponent value. Finally note that standard properties of the primitive function imply
continuity and increasingness in R because R monotonically inﬂuences only the integration range of nonnegative function,
the equilibrium strategy is continuous in R and G1(·) and G2(·) are continuous
A simple hint for deriving Hl(x) is to realize that the terms in the summation (4.9) are from 1 = ((1 − G2(x)) +
(G2(x) − G1(x)) + G1(x))n−1 =∑ 2n−22i2+i10
i1,i20
(n−1)!
i2!i1!(n−1−i2−i1)! (1 − G2(x))i2 (G2(x) − G1(x))i1G
n−1−i2−i1
1 (x). It is similar to
deriving the probability distribution function of order statistics from 1 = ((1 − F (x)) + F (x))n−1 =∑n−1 j0 (n−1)!j!(n−1− j)! (1 −
F (x)) j F n−1− j(x). 
Proof of Theorem 5. Eﬃciency loss is deﬁned in such a way that the two values v ′2, v1 of the two bidders contribute to
it if v ′2 is one of the k highest values but v1 is not and b1 wins a unit but b′2 does not. Consider any pair of two bidders.
Let me denote as v1 the initial value of the ﬁrst bidder and v ′2 as the subsequent value of the second bidder. Since there
are n · (n − 1) of such different pairs, the integral in formula (4.10) is multiplied by n · (n − 1). Next, all opponents of the
two bidders I denote as O . Given the equilibrium strategies (3.5), the difference v ′2 − v1 contributes to MLoss if and only
if:
1. v ′2 is above the reservation price, and v ′2 > v1 = b1(v1, R) > b2(v ′2, R); and
2. For some j = 0, . . . , k/2 − 1 the value realizations of the opponents in O are as follows: j subsequent’s opponent
values are above v ′2, n − k + j initial values of another opponent’s are below v1, and k − 2 j − 2 remaining opponents’
initial values are above v1 and subsequent values are below v ′2.20,21
The inequalities in point 1 above are expressed in the range of integration in formula (4.10). The probability of the
realization of opponent values in point 2 above is expressed in Ω j(v ′2, v1). There are
(n−2)!
j!(n−k+ j)!(k−2 j−2)! combinations of
each realizations in point 2. Since for any j = j′ , the cases in this point above do not occur simultaneously, one can just
sum up (n−2)!j!(n−k+ j)!(k−2 j−2)! Ω j(v
′
2, v1) into Ω(v
′
2, v1). Next, it is easy to check that the term Ω(v
′
2, v1) is the probability that
at least k − 2 values of opponents in O are above v1 and at most k − 2 values of opponents in O are above v2. Therefore
v ′2 is one of the k highest values but v1 is not, and b1 is one of the k highest bids but b1 is not.22 Finally note that
the standard properties of primitive function imply continuity and increasingness in R because R monotonically inﬂuences
only the integration range of the nonnegative function, the equilibrium strategy is continuous in R and G1(·) and G2(·) are
continuous.
A simple hint for deriving Ω(v ′2, v1) is to realize that the terms in the summation (4.10) can be derived when expanding
1 = ((1− G2(v ′2)) + (G2(v ′2) − G1(v1)) + G1(v1))n−2 similarly as I suggest in the proof of Theorem 4. 
Proof of Theorem 6. The fact that b2(v2, R) R for v2  R implies that MLoss(0) − MLoss(R) is at least
v¯0∫
R
R∫
0
(
v2 − v ′1
)
n(n − 1)Ω(v2, v ′1)dG1(v ′1)dG2(v2).
20 The equilibrium strategies (3.5) ensures that for any j there are at least k − 2 opponent bids and both initial bids of the two bidders above b2(v ′2, R)
and at most k− 2 opponent bids and the second bidder’s initial bid are above b1(v1, R) = v1, which implies that b1(v1, R) wins but b2(v ′2, R) does not. At
the same time v ′2 is among the k highest bids and v1 is not.
21 Note that there is no other possibility of realization of MLoss except those described in point 2 given point 1 and (3.5).
22 Note that since the initial value of both bidders, and hence bids, are above v ′2, and also the initial (but not subsequent) bid of the second bidder are
above v1, there are at least k bids above b′2 and at most k − 1 bids below b1 in total. In other words, b1 must win a unit but b′2 does not.
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ULoss(0) − ULoss(R) =
v¯0∫
R
ULoss(0) − ULoss(R)
G2(v¯0) − G2(R) dG2(v2).
Therefore MLoss(0) + ULoss(0) − MLoss(R) − ULoss(R) is at least
v¯0∫
R
n
R∫
0
[
(v2 − v)(n − 1)Ω(v2, v)g1(v) − vHk−1(v)g1(v)
G2(v¯0) − G2(R) −
vHk−2(v)g2(v)
G2(v¯0) − G2(R)
]
dv dG2(v2).
I show that the integrand above consisting of three additive terms is positive for any v suﬃciently close to 0 and any
k = 2, . . . ,2n − 2. At ﬁrst note that
lim
v→0+
Ω(v2, v)
Gn−k1 (v)
= lim
v→0+
Ω0(v2, v)
Gn−k1 (v)
= Gk−22 (v2) > 0 and lim
v→0+
vHk−1(v)
Gn−k1 (v)
= 0.
Since limR→0+ G2(v¯0) − G2(R) > 0 and v2 − v > 0, the second term in the integrand is negligible with respect to the ﬁrst
one for v suﬃciently close to 0. Finally note that the third integrand term is negligible with respect to the ﬁrst one because
limv→0+
vHk−2(v)g2(v)
Gn−k1 (v)g1(v)
= 0, which is an implication of condition D.
Therefore MLoss(0) + ULoss(0) − MLoss(R) − ULoss(R) is positive for any R suﬃciently close to 0. Moreover if the strat-
egy is continuous in R , then MLoss(R) + ULoss(R) is continuous in R . Therefore it must be that MLoss(R) + ULoss(R) is
decreasing in the neighborhood of 0. 
Proof of Theorem 8. If k = 2 ·n−1 3 and R = 0, then at most one bid does not win a unit. Since the strategy is increasing
in a symmetric equilibrium, to ﬁnish the proof note that the losing bid is the subsequent bid of a bidder with the lowest
value. 
A.1. Comments to Lemma 2 and Corollary 7
To understand how is the condition C related to continuity of strategy, note that if opponents use strategy b−(v) with
shape (3.5) such that b−2(·) is not continuous at v2, then the bidder’s marginal payoff at the discontinuity is nonnegative;
i.e., ∂π(v,b|b−(·))
∂b2
 0 for some b2 ∈ (limu→v−2 b−2(v2), limu→v+2 b−2(v2)). Next, if n  k  2, then this inequality equation
expands to
(v2 − b2)
 k−22 ∑
i2=0
(n − 1)!Ai2(b2)Bk−2−2i2(b2)Gn−k+i21 (u1(b2))g1(b2)
i2!(k − 2− 2i2)!(n − k + i2)!

 k−12 ∑
i2=0
(n − 1)!Ai2(b2)Bk−1−2i2(b2)Gn−k+i21 (u1(b2))
i2!(k − 1− 2i2)!(n − k + i2)! (A.1)
where u1(·), and u2(·) are the inverse of opponent strategies b−(·); A(b2) = 1 − G2(u2(b2)) is the probability that the
two bids of an opponent are above b2; B(b2) = G2(u2(b2)) − G1(u1(b2)) is the probability that an opponent submits an
initial bid above and the subsequent bid below b2; and G1(u1(b2)) is the probability that two bids of an opponent are
below b2. Remark that if the bidder uses the same strategy as his opponents, then u2(b2) = v2, and that if the opponents
bid the initial value in the initial bid, u1(b2) = b2. Therefore the terms A(b2), B(b2) and G1(u1(b2)) are equal to 1− G2(v2),
G2(v2) − G1(b2), and G1(b2), respectively. In other words, these terms can be expressed independently of the opponent
strategy b−(·) when bidders are symmetric and use symmetric equilibrium strategies.
Finally, comparing the corresponding summation terms in Eq. (A.1), one gets the following inequalities (k − 1 −
2i2)g1(b2) G2(v2)−G1(b2)v2−b2 for i2 = 0, . . . ,  k−22 . Using the mean value theorem on the right side of each of these inequalities,
one gets (k − 1 − 2i2)g1(b2) G2(b2)−G1(b2)v2−b2 + g2(b˜) for some b˜ ∈ [b2, v2] that is incompatible with condition C. Therefore,
condition C implies ∂π(v,b|b−(·))
∂b2
< 0.
Moreover, the subsequent strategy is continuous and increasing in R . It is also obvious that condition C can be relaxed
but it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd another general condition.
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